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1. Introduction 
 
Globalization in the last few decades has generated an unprecedented increase in 
international trade flows.1  While the advantages to this process are many, the rise in 
economic openness that has accompanied globalization has also made countries more 
vulnerable to international economic volatility, and to trade volatility in particular (Rodrik, 
1998; Mansfield and Reinhardt, 2008). Such instability is a major cause for concern 
because in an open economy, volatility of trade can have various adverse consequences. 
Specifically, such volatility can retard economic growth, deter trade and investment, raise 
the cost of external borrowing, aggravate budget deficits, decrease personal income 
security, and reduce public support for integration in the global economy.  
 
These potential misfortunes have led many policy makers around the globe to sound the 
alarm against rising trade volatility. In this regard, researchers have recently recognized 
that international organizations possess a number of unique features that work together to 
help states manage international volatility. For instance, Mansfield and Reinhardt (2008) 
found that international trade institutions—such as the GATT/WTO and preferential 
trading agreements (PTAs) — reduced trade volatility by constraining member-states from 
introducing new trade barriers, diversifying the composition of trade and foreign direct 
investment flows, and increasing transparency in policy, expectations and trade standards 
and policy instruments. Rose (2005), on the other hand, has shown that membership in the 
GATT/WTO has no dampening effect on trade volatility. Similar results can also be found 
in Marting and Simmons (1998) and Braumoeller (2006), among others. 
 
Given the lack of a clear consensus on this important trade policy issue, this paper aims to 
take this research forward by addressing two basic questions. First, does the GATT/WTO 
reduce the bilateral trade volatility among WTO members? Second, how does the bilateral 
trade volatility of WTO members co-vary with the volatilities of their trading partners, 
depending on partners’ WTO membership? 
                                                        
1 Between 1950 and 2005, the average annual growth rate of the volume of world exports was 6.2% (7.5% 
for manufacturers), compared with a GDP growth of 3.8% (WTO, 2007).  
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Few existing studies directly address the relationship between international organization 
membership and trade volatility. Exceptions include Rose (2005) and Mansfield and 
Reinhardt (2008), who examine whether GATT/WTO decreases bilateral trade volatility. 
Both studies control for bilateral characteristics such as geographical distance, taking 
observations of different dyads as independent of one another. However, bilateral trade 
volatility between an importer and an exporter may depend not only on bilateral 
characteristics, but also on trade volatilities of other dyads. In other words, observations of 
trade volatility of different country pairs can be interdependent. For example, volatility of 
trade between the U.S. and Thailand depends not only on the GDP per capita of the U.S. 
and Thailand (and other country level characteristics specific to this pair of countries), but 
also on trade volatility between the U.S. and South Korea and the trade volatility between 
the U.S. and Japan. In this paper, we include other dyads’ trade volatility as an additional 
determinant of the trade volatility of a dyad of interest. Our study thus complements Rose 
(2005) and Mansfield and Reinhardt (2008). If bilateral trade volatility is affected by trade 
volatility between other dyads (which is very likely), omitting a measure of the multilateral 
dependence of trade volatility can lead to biased estimated coefficients and invalid 
statistical inferences.  
 
Our sample includes bilateral trade data for 210 countries over the period 1948-2003, 
which is the most complete country coverage among available bilateral trade datasets. We 
link different dyads by WTO membership, geographical distance between countries, and 
trade relationship and create a spatial term of other dyads’ trade volatility, which will be 
described in detail in Section 3. We find that, with a spatial term of trade volatility in 
regressions, a dyad’s trade volatility is lower when both partners are WTO members. In 
addition, our results provide strong evidence for interdependence of trade volatilities. We 
find comovement of trade volatilities across all dyads in general, and such comovement is 
much stronger among WTO members than between WTO and non-WTO members. Our 
results are robust to different measures of trade volatilities and different subsamples. The 
comovement of trade volatilities among WTO members implies that member countries not 
only share the benefits of having an interdependent and more predictable trade system, but 
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also share the risks of contagious world trade collapse as evidenced by the 2008 world 
financial crisis. Finally, we show that countries of larger economic sizes can do better in 
coping with the contagion; regional trade agreements (RTAs), currency unions (CUs), and 
the General System of Preferences (GSP) among WTO members help to diversify the risks 
and alleviate the contagion sourced from other WTO members. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A review of the existing literature and the 
theoretical underpinning of the two hypotheses considered in this paper are presented in 
Section 2. The methodology is presented in Section 3, and the regression results are 
discussed in Sections 4 and 5. The paper ends with concluding policy remarks in Section 
6. 
 
2  The WTO and Trade Volatilities: Theoretical Issues 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), are often recognized as among the most successful multilateral 
institutions in the last six decades (Bagwell and Staiger, 2002; Bhagwati, 1999). The 
impressive annual growth in world trade of 6.2% between 1950 and 2005 is often attributed 
to the visible role played by WTO in reducing barriers to trade through eight successive 
rounds of negotiations. In the following, we review briefly the literature on the effects of 
trade and trade agreements on the level and volatility of bilateral trade, as well as the 
adverse impact of trade volatility on economic development.  
 
Somewhat surprisingly, however, when Rose (2004) sets out to quantify the trade-
enhancing role of WTO membership in an econometric study of world trade based on the 
gravity equation, he concludes that GATT/WTO had a limited role in the promotion of 
world trade. His findings have sparked a growing body of literature. In response to Rose’s 
conclusions, Subramanian and Wei (2007) show that the impact differs across countries 
and sectors because of asymmetries within the GATT/WTO system. They demonstrate that 
the growth in trade flows of the industrialized countries is higher than that in the developing 
countries that are also part of the system, and the trade promoting effect of the GATT/WTO 
is stronger for some sectors than others. Taking into account both formal GATT/WTO 
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members and non-member participants, Tomz et al. (2007) find that the GATT/WTO has 
had substantial positive effects on trade.2 All of these papers cover only positive bilateral 
trade flows to study the trade effect of the WTO at the intensive margin. Helpman, Melitz, 
and Rubinstein (2008) and Liu (2009) include both positive and zero bilateral trade flows 
and show that the WTO has a strong effect at the extensive margin by creating new trading 
relationship. A number of papers address Rose’s WTO puzzle from other aspects, but we 
do not intend to be exhaustive here. Overall, these papers take a more optimistic view of 
the WTO in promoting bilateral trade.  
 
It is now generally accepted that the boost in international trade in the last several decades 
has also led to more volatility and uncertainty in trade. A number of distinct economic 
mechanisms are at play in the relationship between openness to trade and trade volatility 
(Haddad et al 2012). The overall effect is, however, ambiguous and needs to be identified 
empirically. On one hand, as export earnings increase, the terms of trade can directly affect 
output and growth in a major way. Declining demand overseas not only reduces export 
shipments and harms producer revenues, but also can lead to falling prices and worsening 
terms of trade. On the other hand, as a country’s export sector responds to overseas market 
conditions, it becomes relatively less correlated with home market conditions. Because 
demand shocks at home and overseas are only imperfectly correlated, this force tends to 
reduce overall volatility in output. Moreover, outward orientation means that a country is 
more likely to export more products to more markets – an international diversification. A 
country’s exports is similar to an investment portfolio. Exporting one product to one 
foreign market is a very risky endeavor because the exporting country is completely 
dependent on demand conditions in that one importing country. Exporting multiple 
products to a range of foreign markets reduces this risk through a diversification effect. 
However, there is a tension between international diversification from outward orientation 
and the specialization that trade induces (Kellman and Shachmurove, 2011). Evidence 
suggests that specialization does not dominate until countries are well into the high-income 
                                                        
2 Tomz et al. (2007) argue that Rose’s analysis overlooks a large group of countries to which the trade 
agreement applied and classified them incorrectly as nonparticipants (non-member participants). This 
causes a downward bias in the estimated effect of GATT/WTO on trade. 
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group. Although these mechanisms apply to trade in general, they also apply to trade 
agreements such as the WTO with trade liberalization being their primary objective. 
 
In comparison to the growing literature on the trade impact of WTO membership, the 
number of papers looking at the impact of membership on trade volatility is scant. Rose 
(2005) examines the hypothesis that membership in the GATT/WTO has increased the 
stability and predictability of trade flows. Using a large data set covering bilateral trade 
flows between over 175 countries between 1950 and 1999, he finds little evidence that 
membership in the GATT/WTO has significant dampening effect on trade volatility. 
Mansfield and Reinhardt (2008), on the other hand, assume that exposure to global markets 
increases terms of trade volatility. Governments seek to insulate their economies from such 
instability through membership in international trade institutions, particularly the WTO 
and preferential trading arrangements (PTAs). They hypothesize that international 
institutions reduce trade volatility through three related mechanisms. First, trade 
agreements reduce future volatility in trade-flows by ‘locking-in’ states’ existing trade 
commitments and deterring the erection of new protectionist barriers. Second, trade-
agreements increase policy transparency and promote policy convergence among member 
states, which they argue reduces trade volatility by stabilizing the expectations of traders, 
providing these actors with clearer avenues for trade dispute resolution and settlement. 
Third, international trade institutions signal long-term predictability and low credit-risk 
environments to international investors. This, in turn, reassures investors that governments 
will not engage in predatory behaviors, increases FDI flows and shifts FDI composition 
more towards vertical and export-platform FDI, and helps to diversify export portfolios, all 
of which decrease international economic volatility. Using bilateral export data from 1951 
through 2001, they provide support for their arguments: PTAs and the WTO regime 
significantly reduce export volatility.  
 
Finally, recent empirical studies have established that trade volatility harms countries 
through several interrelated channels, justifying the importance of understanding the 
sources of the volatility and policy instruments to cope with the volatility. Perhaps most 
notably, volatile trade flows can significantly undermine a country’s domestic economic 
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stability. In this regard, trade volatility has been found to (i) threaten workers’ employment 
and wages (Scheve and Slaughter, 2004), (ii) reduce firm profits and market 
competitiveness (Aizenman, 2003), and (iii) depress or destabilize economic growth 
(Rodrik, 1998, 1999; Kim, 2007).  
 
The latter effect - that of trade volatility on aggregate economic growth - has been found 
to be especially acute (Rodrik, 1998, 1999; Grimes, 2006). For example, in a multi-decade 
study of New Zealand, Grimes reports that “approximately half the variance in annual GDP 
growth over 45 years can be explained by the level and volatility of the terms of trade”, 
while others find that these adverse effects of trade volatility may be even more severe for 
developing countries (Blattman, Hwang and Williamson, 2007; Razin, Sadka and Coury, 
2003). Second, and in part as a result of its harmful economic effects, trade volatility can 
also increase civil conflict. The harm done to growth, investment, and employment by trade 
volatility lead to increased social and distributional conflicts between groups and 
governments, especially in countries with weak domestic institutions (Rodrik, 1999; 
Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2008; Hidalgo et al., 2010). Finally, because trade 
volatility increases uncertainty, it also threatens the profitability of international commerce, 
and hence, reduces the actual size of trade flows between countries (Mansfield and 
Reinhardt, 2008). Thus, trade instability poses a multitude of political and economic threats 
to societies and governments. 
 
Building on the existing literature, the goal of the current paper is to show that WTO 
members not only benefit from growing international trade, but also share the risks and 
volatility.  Specifically, we show that trade volatility co-moves among the dyads within 
WTO, but not so strongly between dyads within the WTO and those outside the WTO. This 
finding can be driven by, but not limited to, the following. First, similar to Mansfield and 
Reinhardt (2008), we find that the WTO reduces the volatility of the bilateral trade. If all 
the bilateral trade within the WTO becomes less volatile, we should observe a comovement 
of trade volatility under the WTO. This comovement is simply driven by the fact that the 
WTO reduces the volatility of trade among members. In this case, our previous discussion 
on how trade openness and trade agreements reduce trade volatility also applies. Second, 
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if a WTO member lowers its MFN tariffs, the lower tariffs should apply to all of the other 
WTO members according to the non-discrimination clause, but not to non-WTO members. 
This may lead to a comovement within the WTO, but not for the bilateral trade between 
members and non-members. Third, with increasing global outsourcing and production 
fragmentation, the production can be more vertically integrated among WTO members, 
which can in turn lead to the comovement of trade volatility among WTO members. 
 
3. Empirical Methodology  
3.1 Empirical Specification and Data 
Our empirical analysis uses a gravity model, which has been widely used to study the 
variations in trade volume. We start with a basic gravity-type specification and focus on 
the potential comovement of trade volatilities among WTO members as follows: 
𝑉𝑜𝑙(𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾
′𝑍 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡, (1) 
where Mijt represents the value of c.i.f. imports of country i from country j; 𝑉𝑜𝑙(𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡) is 
the volatility of Mijt. We measure import volatility as a standardized deviation of imports 
from its predicted value. Specifically, 
 
(2)
 
where Ln(Mijt)_trend is a predicted value of import of country i from country j modeled as 
a third order polynomial in time trend and abs represents absolute value. Rose (2005) uses 
the standard deviation of imports over mean value of imports over a certain period of time 
to measure trade volatility. By comparison, our measure in equation (2) has a number of 
advantages. First, a de-trended measure is more appropriate than a simple standard 
deviation when a country’s import experiences a growing or a declining trend as the 
standard deviation can be large due to either a volatile trade pattern or a large and steady 
growth or decline. Empirical studies need to capture the former, not the latter. Second, our 
measure is less sensitive to missing observations. For example, even if a country’s trade 
follows a smooth growth trajectory over time, the calculated standard deviation can be 
large if many years of trade data are missing in between and only the trade data of the very 
first years (of small values) and that of very last several years (of large values) are observed. 
Third, our measure better preserves time variations in the sample, while the standard 
]
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deviation, if calculated over the entire sample period, has only one observation for a dyad. 
For robustness checks, in addition to the volatility measure in equation (2), we also adopt 
a few other measures including one similar to that in Rose (2005). 
 
Following Tomz et al. (2007), Bothinijt is a dummy variable taking the value of one if both 
importing and exporting countries are de facto WTO members (either formal members or 
non-member participants) and zero otherwise; Z is a vector of other control variables 
commonly chosen in a gravity model, including log value of real GDP of i and j (lnGDPit 
and lnGDPjt), log value of real GDP per capita of i and j (lnGDPPCit  and lnGDPPCjt ), log 
value of the great-circle distance between i and j (lnDistij), log value of the geographical 
area of i and j (lnAreai and lnAreaj), the number of landlocked countries in a pair 
(Landlockij) (0, 1, or 2), the number of island nations in a pair (Islandij) (0, 1, or 2), whether 
the pair of countries share a border (Borderij), whether i and j share a common language 
(ComLangij), whether i and j share a common religion (ComReligij), whether country i has 
ever been a colony of j (Colonyij), whether country i has ever been a colonizer of j 
(Colonizerij), whether i was currently a colony of  j in year  t (CurColonyijt), whether i was 
currently a colonizer of  j in year t (CurColonizerijt), whether i and j belong to the same 
regional trading agreement in year t (RTAijt) or the same currency union (CUijt), whether j 
offered GSP to i in year t (GSPijt), whether i and j are in a formal alliance in year t 
(Allianceijt) and the military conflict intensity between i and j (Hostilityij).  
 
In bilateral trade panel research, to obtain consistent results, a measure reflecting trade 
frictions between a specific country pair and all other trade partners in addition to trade 
frictions between i and j needs to be included, addressed as the “multilateral resistance 
effect” in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). As discussed in the literature, however, 
accounting for the multilateral resistance term is challenging. For example, Hummels 
(2007) use country-fixed effects for importers and exporters to control for the multilateral 
resistance while Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) point out that those fixed effects should be 
time-varying. As we have a large sample covering 210 countries over the period 1948-
2003, time-varying country fixed effects could be computationally impractical. As a result, 
we use a remoteness measure for a dyad as a proxy for the index of multilateral resistance. 
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Country i’s remoteness is defined as the distance of country i to the rest of the world 
weighted by all the other countries’ GDPs in year t (Remotejt). The remoteness of a dyad 
i-j (Remoteijt) is simply the sum of Remoteit and Remotejt.. 
To examine the effects of dyadic trade volatilities, we introduce four spatial measures into 
the model: 
 
(3) 
These four spatial measures on the right-hand side of equation (3) represent the spatial 
lagged import volatilities for any dyad i-j the weighted average of import volatilities from 
other pairs based on WTO membership. Terms Vi1 and Vi0 represent the average volatility 
of i-m when the exporters ( ) are WTO and non-WTO members (represented by the 
subscripts 1 and 0), respectively. Terms V1j and V0j represent the average trade volatility 
between k-j when the importers ( ) are WTO and non-WTO members (represented by 
the subscripts 1 and 0), respectively. In the next subsection, we will introduce a general 
spatial lag model and describe the spatial lags in equation (3) in detail.  
 
3.2 Spatial Lag Model in General and Dyadic Spatial Effects 
Spatial analysis recognizes the importance of geographical locations and distance in social 
economic activities. Often, two spatial effects are tested - spatial dependence and spatial 
heterogeneity. Spatial dependence occurs when the observation in location i is correlated 
with observations in other locations j while spatial heterogeneity indicates that the 
functional form of a model as well as coefficients in a regression can vary across different 
locations in space. As our main interest is the comovement of trade volatilities, we will 
focus on spatial dependence, specifically the spatial lag model, rather than spatial 
heterogeneity. 
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The essence of a basic spatial lag model is reflected in the first law of geography, 
“Everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant 
things” (Tobler, 1970: 236). Formally, we can state:  
𝐘 = 𝐗𝛽 + 𝜌𝐖𝐘 + 𝛜 (4) 
where Y is an 𝑁 × 1 vector of observations for a monadic cross-sectional sample with N 
units (or across N locations); X is an 𝑁 × 𝑀 matrix of explanatory variables; 𝛽 is a vector 
of M coefficients. The term 𝐖𝐘 on the right-hand side of equation (4) is called the spatially 
lagged dependent variable, with W an 𝑁 × 𝑁 matrix measuring the connectivity between 
N number of 𝑦𝑖 and N number of 𝑦𝑗. For any 𝑦𝑖, the term 𝐖𝐘 is a weighted average of all 
𝑦𝑗′𝑠 in neighboring locations or a lag of 𝑦𝑖 over space. Consequently, equation (4) suggests 
that the variation in each observation of y is explained by its dependence on the others. The 
sign and magnitude of 𝜌 illustrate the impact of the spatial lag on the dependent variable. 
If 𝜌 is positive, an increase in spatially weighted y in all other locations j (for all j ≠ i) is 
associated with an increase in 𝑦𝑖. Conversely, if 𝜌 is negative, then an increase in spatially 
weighted y in all other locations j is associated with a decrease in𝑦𝑖.  
 
For panel data with N units and T time periods, the weight matrix W becomes a block 
diagonal matrix of 𝑁𝑇 × 𝑁𝑇 with each block capturing a single year’s observations. With 
T time periods, the weight matrix can be expressed as equation (5)3:  
 
 
 
(5) 
where 𝐖𝐭 = [
0 𝑤𝑡(𝑖𝑗) 𝑤𝑡(𝑖𝑘)
𝑤𝑡(𝑗𝑖) 0 𝑤𝑡(𝑗𝑘)
𝑤𝑡(𝑘𝑖) 𝑤𝑡(𝑘𝑗) 0
] with 𝑤𝑡(∙) a weight function. Each block matrix 
Wt is an 𝑁 × 𝑁 symmetric matrix and entries of Wt connect two units among i, j and k in 
year t. The diagonal elements of Wt are zeros in order that no observation of Y predicts 
itself.  
 
Dyadic Spatial Model 
                                                        
3 The weight matrix W is also row-standardized so that each row sums to unity. 
W =
W1 0 0 0
0 W2 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0 WT
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In our study, we have dyadic data with a source country and a target country as imports of 
country i from country j are different from imports of country j from country i, which is 
referred to as directed dyads4. In a dyadic framework, spatial dependence implies that the 
interaction between two units in a pair is explained by interactions between units in other 
pairs and such interdependence becomes more complicated than in the monadic case. 
Neumayer and Plümper (2010) are among the first ones to systematically categorize the 
complex ways of modeling dependence with dyadic data. Following Neumayer and 
Plümper, we express a generic form of dyadic spatial lag model (ignoring other explanatory 
variables in the model) in equation (6), 
 (6) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡  is an observation with source country i and target country j at time t. For 
instance, 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 can represent import of country i from country j in year t. Note that in this 
case the words “source” and “target” are used to simply suggest that yij and yji are not 
identical and they do not necessarily represent the direction of trade flows. To avoid 
confusion, we will use importer/exporter rather than source/target country in most cases in 
this paper. The wpq in equation (6) is a weight determining the connectivity between dyads 
km and ij at time t, with row-standardization where ∑ 𝑤𝑝𝑞 = 1 . Neumayer and Plümper 
(2010) have presented all variations of equation (6) in their paper. We will describe two of 
the specifications applicable to this study, namely the exporter specific contagion and the 
importer specific contagion. Interested readers are referred to Neumayer and Plümper for 
an extensive discussion of all possible specifications. 
 
Spatial Lags in Equation (3) 
Now we go back to our model in equation (3). The four spatial measures are included as 
we take into consideration both the demand and supply side of trade volatilities of “other 
pairs” as, 
                                                        
4 Distance between two countries is an example of undirected dyad information since distance from i to j is 
the same as distance from j to i. 
yijt = r wpqykmt +eijt
ij¹km
å
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 𝑉𝑖1𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑊𝑇𝑂 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑙(𝑀𝑖𝑚𝑡)
𝑚≠𝑗
 
    𝑉𝑖0𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑊𝑇𝑂 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑙(𝑀𝑖𝑚𝑡)𝑚≠𝑗  
𝑉1𝑗𝑡 = ∑ 𝜃𝑊𝑇𝑂 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑙(𝑀𝑘𝑗𝑡)
𝑘≠𝑖
 
                                                𝑉0𝑗𝑡 = ∑ 𝑤𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑊𝑇𝑂 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑙(𝑀𝑘𝑗𝑡)𝑘≠𝑖  
 
The first two measures of spatial lags, Vi1 and Vi0, are importer specific contagion spatial 
lag terms, allowing us to analyze how the volatility of imports of country i from country j 
is related to the volatility of imports of country i from other exporting countries m, where 
𝑚 ≠ 𝑗. For example, the volatility of imports of the U.S. from Thailand is correlated with 
the volatility of imports of the U.S. from India or with the volatility of imports of the U.S. 
from Germany. The weight 𝑤𝑊𝑇𝑂 equals one if country m is a WTO member and zero 
otherwise, and the weight 𝑤𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑊𝑇𝑂 takes the value of one if country m is not a WTO 
member. As a result, 𝑉𝑖1𝑡 shows the average volatility of imports of country i from other 
WTO member exporters (excluding j) in year t. The term 𝑉𝑖0𝑡 is an average volatility of 
imports of country i from other non-WTO exporters (excluding j) in year t.  
 
The next two spatial lags, 𝑉1𝑗𝑡 and 𝑉0𝑗𝑡 are exporter specific contagion terms, allowing us 
to analyze how the volatility of imports of country i from country j may be influenced by 
the volatility of imports of other importing countries k from the same exporting country j. 
This suggests, for example, the volatility of imports of the U.S. from Thailand is influenced 
by the volatility of imports of Germany from Thailand or by the volatility of imports of 
India from Thailand. The weight 𝜃𝑊𝑇𝑂 is one when the importing country k is a WTO 
member and zero if not. Similarly, the weight 𝜃𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑊𝑇𝑂 equals one when the importing 
country k is a non-WTO member and zero otherwise. As a result, the coefficient on 𝑉1𝑗𝑡 
gives the average impact of volatility of imports of WTO member importers from the 
exporter j on volatility of imports of i from j. The coefficient on 𝑉0𝑗𝑡 shows the average 
impact of volatility of imports of non-WTO member importers from the exporter j on the 
volatility of imports of i from j.  
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For reasons discussed later, we will restrict our sample in our empirical analysis to the 
dyads with both importer i and exporter j being WTO members. Figure 1 illustrates 
graphically how we define these spatial terms for dyad 𝑖𝑗 . Note that when WTO 
membership is the sole weight to construct the spatial lags, and both countries i and j are 
WTO members, the value of the exporter specific contagion term  will be the same for 
an importer (i) each year, not varying with exporting countries. Similarly, the importer 
specific contagion term  will be the same for an exporter (j), regardless the exporters. 
However, term  is not importer i-specific each year because we leave country j out for 
each dyad ij (i.e., ). Similarly,  is not exporter j-specific either each year because 
we leave country i out for each dyad i-j ( ).  
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
The data used in our analysis are from Liu (2009). As mentioned earlier, this sample covers 
210 countries over the period 1948-2003 and, to the best of our knowledge, has the most 
complete country coverage among available bilateral trade datasets. Summary statistics of 
the variables in our model are provided in Table 1. 
 
4.1 Traditional regressions without spatial measures 
Our baseline regression results on the effect of WTO membership on trade volatility 
without spatial measures are reported in Table 2. The three columns in Table 2 represent 
OLS regression, regression with importer and exporter fixed effects (denoted as ctry fixed 
effects in the table), and regression with dyad fixed effects, respectively. Time fixed effects 
are always included in regressions.  
 
The coefficient on Bothin in Table 2 is consistently negative across all regressions and 
significant at the 1% level. These results suggest that if both trade partners are de facto 
WTO members, they tend to have more stable trade. The negative and significant 
coefficients on RTA, GSP, and CU also indicate more stable trade of the dyads covered by 
these trade agreements or currency unions.  
tiV 0
jtV0
tiV 1
jm  jtV1
ik 
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4.2 Regressions with spatial measures, using trade between WTO members 
 
To better explore whether WTO members experience a convergence in trade volatility 
among themselves, we restrict our sample to observations with both the exporter and the 
importer being WTO members and report the results in Table 3. Note that the exporter and 
importer specific contagion spatial lags are still calculated based on all dyads in the whole 
sample and then we run regressions including only dyads with both countries being de facto 
WTO members. As both the importer and exporter are WTO members, the variable Bothin 
cannot be included in the regression.  
 
Looking across columns in Table 3, different specifications give qualitatively similar 
results. Coefficients on measures of spatial volatilities are positive and significant at the 
1% level in all regressions, indicating a general synchronization of trade volatilities. The 
positive coefficient on the term Vi1t shows that for dyad i-j with both partners as WTO 
members, an increase in the volatility of imports of i from other WTO exporters is 
associated with an increase in the volatility of import in i from j. In other words, trade 
between WTO members i and j is more stable if trade between the same country i and other 
WTO exporters m is more stable. Similarly, the positive coefficient on V1jt implies that 
imports of WTO member country i from WTO member country j are more stable if trade 
between other WTO importers and the same exporting country j is more stable. These 
results suggest that for WTO members, there is a strong interdependence or comovement 
of their trade volatilities with other WTO members.  
 
The estimated coefficients on 𝑉𝑖0𝑡 and 𝑉0𝑗𝑡 in Table 3 are also positive and significant at 
the 1% level, implying a synchronization of trade volatilities between WTO members and 
non-WTO members. More importantly, the strength of the comovement of trade volatilities 
among WTO members and the strength of the comovement between WTO and non-WTO 
members are considerably different. The estimated coefficients on 𝑉𝑖1𝑡  and 𝑉1𝑗𝑡  range 
between 0.346-0.657 and between 0.285-0.612, respectively. In contrast, the estimated 
coefficients on 𝑉𝑖0𝑡  and 𝑉0𝑗𝑡  range between 0.037-0.069 and between 0.048-0.083, 
15 
 
respectively. So the clustering of trade volatilities between WTO members and non-WTO 
members is much weaker than the clustering of trade volatilities among WTO members.  
 
Note that it is tempting to include all the dyads in the regressions, and redefine the four 
spatial lag terms in theory as follows,  
 
(7
) 
 
Although it seems that we can estimate the coefficient of Bothin as well using the full 
sample, this specification in practice is equivalent to the WTO subsample regressions we 
run for Table 3. Take the first term  in equation (7) as an example. The term of  
takes a positive value only when all three countries ijm are WTO members. For any dyad 
i-j with neither i nor j being a WTO member,  will have a missing value. As a result, 
all dyads with i and j not being WTO members will be dropped from the estimation. 
 
4.3 Robustness Checks 
In this section, we provide a number of robustness checks to ensure an appropriate 
interpretation of our results. We begin by adopting two alternative weight matrices to 
calculate spatial volatilities. We first incorporate geographical distance in the weight 
matrix. To be specific, we replace the weight 𝑤𝑊𝑇𝑂 in the contagion spatial term Vi1 by 
𝑤𝑊𝑇𝑂 ∗
1
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑚
, with 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑚 representing the distance between countries j and m. An inverse 
distance weight is applied to assign a larger weight to those dyads with exporters 
geographically closer to country j. For example, this suggests we would expect the 
volatility of imports of Thailand (i) from the U.S. (j) may be influenced more by the 
volatility of imports of Thailand from Canada (m) than the volatility of imports of Thailand 
Vol(M ijt ) =a +bBothin+l1Vi1 '+l2Vi0 '+l3V1 j '+l4V0 j '+d 'Z +eijt
           Vi1 ' = wWTO *Vol(M imt )
m¹ j
å , where i, j, m are all WTO members
           Vi0 ' = wnon-WTO *Vol(M imt ),  
m¹ j
å where at least one of (i, j, m) is outside the WTO
           V1 j ' = qWTO *Vol(Mkjt )
k¹i
å ,  where i, j, k are all WTO members
           V0 j ' = wnon-WTO *Vol(Mkjt )
k¹i
å ,  where at least one of (i, j, k) is outside the WTO
Vi1 ' Vi1 '
Vi1 '
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from the U.K. (m) as Canada is closer to the U.S. than the U.K. Similarly, for the second 
importer contagion, Vi0, the weight 𝑤𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑊𝑇𝑂 is replaced by 𝑤𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑊𝑇𝑂 ∗
1
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑚
. We also 
apply the same technique to generate the new weight in the two exporter contagion terms: 
𝜃𝑊𝑇𝑂 ∗
1
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑘
 and 𝜃𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑊𝑇𝑂 ∗
1
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑘
.  For the dyad i-j of interest, a larger weight is assigned 
to those pairs located closer to country i or j, holding WTO membership constant. This 
larger weight would imply, for instance, the interdependence of volatility of imports of 
Thailand (i) from the U.S. (j) and the volatility between the imports of Malaysia (k) from 
the U.S. should be stronger than the interdependence between the import volatility in 
Thailand from the U.S. and the import volatility of South Africa (k) from the U.S. as 
Malaysia is closer to Thailand than South Africa.  
 
The second alternative weight matrix measures the connectivity among countries based on 
their “economic distance.” Countries can be geographically far apart while sharing a strong 
economic bond and in turn experience a strong synchronization of trade volatilities (Clark 
and van Wincoop, 2001; Baxter and Kouparitsas, 2005). Countries are considered 
economically closer if they conduct a large volume of trade with each other, ceteris paribus. 
In particular, we replace 
1
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑗𝑚
 in the spatial weight by 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑗𝑚  to construct the new 
importer specific contagion terms, and 
1
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑘
 by 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑘  for new exporter specific 
contagion terms, where 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑗𝑚 is the log value of total trade between countries  j and m, 
and 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑘 the log value of total trade between countries i and k. Hence, the weights in 
exporter specific contagion terms become 𝑤𝑊𝑇𝑂 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑗𝑚 and 𝑤𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑊𝑇𝑂 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑗𝑚, and 
the weights in importer specific contagion terms become 𝜃𝑊𝑇𝑂 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑘 and 𝜃𝑛𝑜𝑛−𝑊𝑇𝑂 ∗
𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑘. 
 
In addition, we estimate regressions without the U.S., the world leading economy, to make 
sure that our results are not dominated by one country. The OPEC countries are also 
excluded from the sample to alleviate influences from oil supply shocks.  
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Results including distance- and trade-weighted spatial volatility measures are provided in 
panel (A) in Table 4. Results for subsamples excluding the U.S. or the OPEC countries are 
presented in panel (B) in Table 4. For the purpose of brevity, we only report estimated 
coefficients on contemporaneous importer and exporter specific contagions and the 
estimated coefficients on RTA, GSP, and CU. Other results, including regressions with 
lagged spatial volatilities, are available upon request. 
 
As we can see, results in Table 4 are in general consistent with results in Table 3. Estimated 
coefficients on all spatial lag terms are positive and significant. Panel (A) suggests 
clustering of trade volatilities among geographical neighbors and among those who have 
strong economic ties with each other. This is especially true for WTO members as the 
coefficients on WTO specific exporter and specific importer contagion terms are 
significantly smaller than the coefficients on non-WTO specific exporter and specific 
importer contagion terms. Panel (B) indicates that our findings are robust to different 
subsamples with or without the U.S. and the OPEC countries. 
 
Next, we conduct additional robustness checks with alternative measures of trade 
volatilities and report results from 18 regressions in Table 5. Again, to save space, we only 
present the coefficients on spatial measures with other results available upon request. Three 
alternative measures of trade volatilities are used for Table 5 regressions. We start with the 
volatility measure used in Rose (2005), which is the coefficient of variation of imports5: 
 
𝑉𝑜𝑙(𝑀𝑖𝑗)𝑇 =
𝜎(𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡)𝑇
𝜇(𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡)𝑇
 
 
(8) 
where 𝜎(𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡)𝑇 is the standard deviation of imports of country i from j over a time period 
T, and 𝜇(𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡)𝑇 denotes the mean value of imports over the same period. We construct the 
other two alternative measures based on methods often used to construct macroeconomic 
volatilities. Our second measure of trade volatility for robustness checks is the standard 
                                                        
5 Rose (2005) uses exports from i to j to construct the volatility measure. 
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deviation of the difference between actual and Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtered imports as 
represented in equation (9): 
 
𝑉𝑜𝑙(𝑀𝑖𝑗)𝑇 =
√∑(𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡)
2
𝑇 − 1
 
 
(9) 
 
where 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐻𝑃 is the difference between actual imports of i from j and the HP-
filtered series (𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐻𝑃 ).6 The third alternative measure of trade volatility is the standard 
deviation of imports growth in country i from country j over a certain period (Bullard, 
1998), which can be denoted as: 
 
𝑉𝑜𝑙(𝑀𝑖𝑗)𝑇 =
√∑[𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡 − ∑ 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡/𝑇]
2
𝑇 − 1
 
 
(10) 
 
where 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the growth of imports of i from j in year t.  
 
Since the volatilities in equations (8)-(10) are measured by standard deviations, we will 
have one observation for each dyad over a certain time period T. As a result, control 
variables in the regressions for Table 6 are all averaged over the same time period T. We 
run three sets of regressions, changing number of years included in a period T. To be more 
specific, the first set of regressions cover pre- and post-Uruguay rounds of GATT 
(T1=1948-1985 and T2=1986-2003). Following Kose et al. (2008), the second set of 
regressions cover the post WWII and Breton Woods era of 1948-1972 (T1), the common 
international shock period of 1973-1986 (T2), and the globalization era of 1987-2003 (T3). 
The last set of regressions cover different stages of GATT/WTO: pre-Kennedy round of 
1948-1967 (T1), Kennedy to Tokyo round of 1968-1978 (T2), Tokyo to Uruguay round of 
                                                        
6 The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is a filter for trend and business cycle estimation. Assume a variable yt 
can be decomposed into a trend and a business cycle component. The HP filter finds a trend estimate by 
solving a penalized optimization problem. The business cycle component is the difference between actual yt 
and the HP filter trend estimate. 
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1979-1994 (T3), and post Uruguay round (WTO) of 1995-2003 (T4) (Felbermayr and 
Kohler, 2010).7  
 
Results in Table 5 in general present a similar picture as previous tables with respect to 
qualitative results concerning trade volatilities among WTO members. The estimated 
coefficients on exporter and importer specific contagion terms based on WTO membership 
are positive and significant in all regressions. Interestingly, non-WTO exporter contagion 
terms are negative in 13 out of 18 regressions and are statistically significant in 10 
regressions. Non-WTO importer specific contagion terms are negative in 14 regressions 
and statistically significant in six of them. Table 5 seems to present even stronger results 
than Tables 3 and 4. The results support synchronization of trade volatilities among WTO 
member trade partners. In contrast, volatility of trade between WTO members either is not 
strongly correlated with or diverges from the trade volatility between WTO and non-WTO 
members.  
 
Finally, time-varying country fixed effects (TVCFEs) can be used in a gravity regression 
to capture the “multilateral resistance”. However, Vi0 and V0j will be dropped when 
TVCFEs are included, so we can no longer see the different effects of the spatial lags based 
on countries’ WTO membership. This is also why we choose to use the measure of 
remoteness for multilateral resistance.8 Without TVCFEs, we might observe a spurious 
correlation between our dependent variable and our spatial trade volatility terms. However, 
                                                        
7 Regressions in Table 5 are estimated using instrumental variables (IV) estimation to control for potential 
endogeneity of the spatial terms, which is typically used in the literature. Following Kelejian et al. (2004), 
instruments for spatial volatilities are WX and WWX, where W is the WTO weight matrix used to create the 
exporter and importer specific contagion terms in Table 3, and X is the vector of control variables used in 
our regressions. The number of observations in Table 6 regressions is about one tenth or one fifth of the 
number of observations in previous tables. Constructing the instruments WX and WWX for regressions in 
Table 6 iscomputational intensive but still feasible. In previous regressions with 60 years of data, however, 
calculating WX and WWX is computationally unfeasible. 
8 As previously mentioned, including time-varying country fixed effects may be computationally impractical 
in our study. In addition, the variations in in Vi1 and V1j measures may be small in later years when there are 
many WTO members. Not much information will be left once TVCFEs are included and the coefficients of 
Vi1 and V1j may not be estimated precisely. We recognize that without including time-varying country 
dummies, our results may be driven by country-year specific unobserved heterogeneity. For example, an 
economic boom in country i could lead to higher trade with all trading partners, and in turn a positive 
association between Vol(Mij) and the spatial lag terms. Including log(GDP) can help to control for economic 
booms or recessions and alleviate such a concern. 
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the spurious correlation alone would not explain why the coefficients on Vi1 and V1j are 
much larger than those on Vi0 and V0j. In other words, WTO membership must play a role. 
 
5. How to Cope with Contagion? 
 
If countries under the WTO share the risk of trade volatility, one natural question is what 
we can do to alleviate this problem. Are there specific policy instruments countries can use 
to cope with contagion? In this paper, we examine specifically whether some country or 
dyad characteristics, such as, country size and policies related to signing other types of 
integration agreements can help in this regard. To answer this question, we include in our 
baseline regressions some interaction terms between the spatial lag measures and country’s 
GDP and indicators for RTAs, CUs, and GSP. Our results in the previous section show a 
statistically and economically similar effect of Vi1 and V1j, and of Vi0 and V0j. To avoid 
adding too many interaction terms and ease the interpretation, we combine  Vi1 and V1j into 
one term named V1, and also combine Vi0 and V0j  into one term named V0 For a similar 
reason, we also combine log value of GDP for the two countries in a dyad into lgdpsum, 
defined as the sum of log(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖) and log (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗) in a dyad. The results are reported in Table 
6. 
 
First, the negative coefficients of V1*lgdpsum and V0*lgdpsum suggest that larger 
economic size can help to alleviate the contagion, especially the contagion from within the 
WTO. This is not surprising because larger countries, which usually rely more on domestic 
markets, are more resilient to external risks. The weaker effect of V0*lgdpsum than that of 
V1*lgdpsum may result from the much smaller level effect of V0 (i.e., the smaller coefficient 
of V0 as compared to the coefficient of V1). RTAs and CUs between two WTO members 
help to alleviate the contagion from within the WTO as suggested by the negative and 
significant coefficients of V1*RTA and V1*CU, but their effects on the contagion from 
outside the WTO are much weaker as shown by the insignificant and much smaller 
coefficients of V0*RTA and V0*CU. This can also be partially driven by the much smaller 
level effect of V0. But this does not seem to be the only reason because the coefficients of 
V1*GSP and V0*GSP are both negative and significant, with a similar magnitude. Here is 
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another possible interpretation. In our restricted sample with both countries in a dyad being 
WTO members, V0 is based on the trade between WTO members and non-WTO members 
which usually constitutes a small portion of the trade of WTO members, while trade within 
the WTO and covered by RTAs or CUs are usually among major or natural trading partners. 
In other words, the trade flows related to V0 and those related to RTAs/CUs are not very 
relevant to each other, which may explain the insignificant interaction effect between RTAs 
(CUs) and V0.  
 
Overall, results in Table 6 point out a benign role of other types of trade and currency 
common agreements that can help a country to diversify its trade, and hence make it less 
vulnerable to external trade volatility. However, a country can only alleviate the contagion 
problem to some extent. This problem cannot be eliminated completely as suggested by 
the smaller coefficients of the interaction terms relative to the much larger coefficient of 
V1, with the only exception of V0*GSP. This is true even for U.S.-China, the country pair 
with the largest combined GDP in log in our sample at a value of 31.56 in 2002. Taking 
the third regression in Table 6 as an example, the overall effect of V1 is still positive for 
U.S.-China in 2002 (i.e., 1.287-0.038*33.56 = 0.012). The corresponding estimated effect 
for a dyad with an average combined log(GDP) at a value of 21.49, our sample average, is 
0.47, everything else equal.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Several studies have suggested that exposure to global markets increases terms of trade 
volatility and governments try to insulate their economies from such instability through 
membership in international trade institutions like the WTO and preferential trading 
arrangements. Research exploring the relationship between WTO and trade volatility is 
rather scarce and existing studies on this topic (Rose, 2005; Mansfield and Reinhardt 2008) 
do not focus on the interdependence of trade volatilities across dyads. However, as it is 
possible that bilateral trade volatility is affected by trade volatility between other dyads, 
omitting a measure of the interdependence of trade volatility can lead to biased estimates 
and invalid statistical inferences. 
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Using bilateral trade data for 210 countries over the period 1948-2003, this paper attempts 
to shed some light on the relationship between WTO and members’ trade volatilities by 
concentrating on three questions: (i) does the GATT/WTO reduce the bilateral trade 
volatility? (ii) how does the bilateral trade volatility of WTO members co-vary with the 
volatilities of their trading partners, depending on partners’ WTO membership? and (iii) 
how countries can cope with the contagion? The initial results suggest that if both trade 
partners are de facto WTO members, they tend to experience more stable trade. In after 
including spatial measures of trade volatilities, we find that trade volatilities commove 
among different dyads. Such a comovement is more evident among dyads with all WTO 
members than between a dyad with two WTO members and a dyad with at least one non-
member. Other factors such as regional trading agreements, the Generalized System of 
Preferences program, and currency unions can not only contribute to more stable trade of 
a dyad, but also help to alleviate the contagion by diversifying a country’s trade risks and 
reducing trade volatility. A large economic size is also found to be able to help a country 
cope with the contagion. 
 
For policy purposes, it is important to note that the trade stabilizing effect of WTO may be 
over-estimated if we ignore the interdependence of trade volatilities among different dyads. 
The comovement of trade volatilities among WTO members implies that member countries 
share the benefits of having an interdependent and more predictable trade system. 
However, they also share the risks of contagious world trade collapse as evidenced by the 
2008 world financial crisis. Nevertheless, a better understanding of this interdependence 
can enhance our awareness so that countries are more cautious when implementing policies 
that might affect adversely other countries and are more prepared to cope with these risks. 
Our results indicate that signing other types of integration agreements can help in this 
regard.  
 
Finally, recent empirical research about the impact of international trade organizations 
highlights the increase in the level of trade without taking trade volatility into account. 
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Once that is done, the beneficial impact of trade organizations and trade agreements 
becomes clearer. 
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Figure 1: Spatial measures for dyad ij, with arrows denoting the directions   
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Observations 
Vol(Mijt) 0.0440617 0.0583637 0 3.022876 556182 
Bothin 0.6185206 0.4857502 0 1 556182 
Vi1t 0.0391838 0.0184222 0.000106 0.2786563 555896 
Vi0t 0.0541362 0.0273928 2.53E-05 0.40076 552665 
V1jt 0.0416369 0.0226584 1.35E-05 0.2750573 555797 
V0jt 0.0478988 0.0277674 1.39E-05 0.7776468 550541 
RTA 0.1082595 0.3107082 0 1 556182 
GSP 0.161039 0.3675673 0 1 556182 
CU 0.0311247 0.1736549 0 1 556182 
log(GDPi) 10.53615 2.157975 0.815365 16.09527 533895 
log(GDPj) 10.93147 1.998777 0.815365 16.09527 536734 
log(GDPPCi) 1.607624 1.076731 -1.9696 3.90099 533895 
log(GDPPCj) 1.666702 1.048224 -1.9696 3.90099 536734 
log(AREAi) 11.81796 2.550174 1.94591 16.92467 556182 
log(AREAj) 12.10186 2.411059 1.94591 16.92457 556182 
border 0.0339349 0.1810619 0 1 556182 
landlock 0.2612113 0.4805239 0 2 556182 
island 0.3579692 0.5582787 0 2 556182 
samelang 0.1255326 0.3313222 0 1 556182 
samerelig 0.5619743 0.4961448 0 1 556182 
colony 0.0136754 0.1161395 0 1 556182 
colonizer 0.0130641 0.1135492 0 1 556182 
curcolony 0.0025729 0.0506585 0 1 556182 
curcolonizer 0.0024398 0.0493346 0 1 556182 
comcol 0.1567616 0.3635762 0 1 556182 
remote 0.9373566 1.784062 0 4.509501 556182 
alliance 0.1016214 0.3021501 0 1 556182 
hostility 0.0176263 0.1099645 0 2.517857 556182 
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Table 2. Results of WTO Membership and Trade Volatility 
 2.1 2.2 2.3 
VARIABLES OLS Cty FE Dyad FE 
Bothin -0.0033*** -0.0054*** -0.0051*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
RTA -0.0041*** -0.0070*** -0.0052*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
GSP -0.0109*** -0.0093*** -0.0041*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) 
CU -0.0064*** -0.0072*** -0.0100*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0006) (0.0024) 
log(GDPi) -0.0044*** -0.0002 -0.0047*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0009) 
log(GDPj) -0.0089*** -0.0058*** -0.0038*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0010) 
log(GDPPCi) -0.0060*** -0.0083*** -0.0042*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0009) 
log(GDPPCj) -0.0014*** -0.0078*** -0.0088*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0011) 
log(AREAi) 0.0015*** 0.0024***  
 (0.0001) (0.0007)  
log(AREAj) 0.0030***   
 (0.0001)   
border -0.0104*** -0.0089***  
 (0.0012) (0.0004)  
landlock -0.0034*** 0.0131***  
 (0.0004) (0.0032)  
island 0.0026*** 0.0769***  
 (0.0004) (0.0083)  
samelang -0.0018** -0.0058***  
 (0.0009) (0.0004)  
samerelig -0.0014*** -0.0024***  
 (0.0004) (0.0002)  
colony -0.0097*** -0.0086***  
 (0.0012) (0.0004)  
colonizer -0.0178*** -0.0114***  
 (0.0017) (0.0005)  
curcolony -0.0040 0.0012 0.0045** 
 (0.0025) (0.0008) (0.0019) 
curcolonizer -0.0011 -0.0027** 0.0077** 
 (0.0037) (0.0012) (0.0032) 
comcol -0.0029*** -0.0045***  
 (0.0008) (0.0003)  
remote -0.0017*** -0.0013*** -0.0290* 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0173) 
alliance -0.0035*** -0.0043*** 0.0016* 
 (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0009) 
hostility 0.0074*** 0.0015**  
 (0.0019) (0.0007)  
Observations 521,852 521,852 521,852 
R-squared 0.121 0.171 0.017 
Notes: Year dummies are included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3. Results with spatial dyadic trade volatility for WTO countries 
 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 
VARIABLES OLS Cty FE Dyad FE OLS lag Cty FE lag Dyad FE lag 
Vi1t 0.6572*** 0.5199*** 0.4996***    
 (0.0154) (0.0116) (0.0139)    
Vi0t 0.0694*** 0.0846*** 0.0541***    
 (0.0085) (0.0064) (0.0070)    
V1jt 0.6122*** 0.3800*** 0.4141***    
 (0.0175) (0.0128) (0.0165)    
Vj0t 0.0831*** 0.0684*** 0.0624***    
 (0.0079) (0.0066) (0.0068)    
Vi1,t-1    0.5469*** 0.3821*** 0.3485*** 
    (0.0148) (0.0112) (0.0130) 
Vi0,t-1    0.0675*** 0.0751*** 0.0372*** 
    (0.0082) (0.0061) (0.0066) 
V1j,t-1    0.5452*** 0.2848*** 0.2997*** 
    (0.0171) (0.0126) (0.0161) 
Vj0,t-1    0.0802*** 0.0588*** 0.0482*** 
    (0.0079) (0.0070) (0.0068) 
 (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
GSP -0.0077*** -0.0108*** -0.0041*** -0.0064*** -0.0094*** -0.0030*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0005) 
CU -0.0066*** -0.0064*** -0.0063** -0.0059*** -0.0059*** -0.0062** 
 (0.0016) (0.0006) (0.0027) (0.0015) (0.0006) (0.0026) 
log(GDPi) -0.0029*** 0.0027*** -0.0027** -0.0029*** 0.0017*** -0.0052*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0011) 
log(GDPj) -0.0039*** -0.0063*** -0.0040*** -0.0040*** -0.0064*** -0.0056*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0002) (0.0007) (0.0014) 
log(GDPPCi) -0.0028*** -0.0078*** -0.0026** -0.0027*** -0.0066*** -0.0002 
 (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0010) 
log(GDPPCj) -0.0002 -0.0015** -0.0024* -0.0003 -0.0018** -0.0007 
 (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0014) 
log(AREAi) 0.0008*** -0.0044***  0.0008*** -0.0043***  
 (0.0001) (0.0007)  (0.0001) (0.0008)  
log(AREAj) 0.0013***   0.0013***   
 (0.0001)   (0.0001)   
border -0.0068*** -0.0063***  -0.0061*** -0.0056***  
 (0.0016) (0.0006)  (0.0015) (0.0006)  
landlock -0.0008 -0.0121***  -0.0006 -0.0020  
 (0.0005) (0.0046)  (0.0005) (0.0047)  
island 0.0015*** 0.0047**  0.0014*** 0.0054**  
 (0.0005) (0.0022)  (0.0005) (0.0022)  
samelang -0.0030*** -0.0056***  -0.0034*** -0.0060***  
 (0.0010) (0.0005)  (0.0010) (0.0004)  
samerelig -0.0018*** -0.0025***  -0.0016*** -0.0021***  
 (0.0005) (0.0003)  (0.0005) (0.0003)  
colony -0.0073*** -0.0083***  -0.0067*** -0.0076***  
 (0.0014) (0.0005)  (0.0013) (0.0005)  
colonizer -0.0150*** -0.0136***  -0.0142*** -0.0125***  
 (0.0016) (0.0006)  (0.0016) (0.0006)  
curcolony 0.0008 0.0025*** 0.0031 0.0002 0.0018** 0.0019 
 (0.0020) (0.0008) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0008) (0.0019) 
curcolonizer 0.0045 0.0002 0.0114*** 0.0041 -0.0012 0.0094*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0013) (0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0013) (0.0028) 
comcol -0.0046*** -0.0052***  -0.0043*** -0.0045***  
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 (0.0008) (0.0004)  (0.0008) (0.0004)  
remote -0.0015*** -0.0014*** -0.0467** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0488*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0200) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0185) 
alliance -0.0043*** -0.0051*** -0.0006 -0.0038*** -0.0044*** 0.0003 
 (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0011) 
hostility 0.0043 0.0019  0.0040 0.0016  
 (0.0031) (0.0012)  (0.0030) (0.0011)  
Observations 316,878 316,878 316,878 292,655 292,655 292,655 
R-squared 0.193 0.205 0.039 0.183 0.198 0.029 
Notes: Year dummies are included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4. Robustness Checks, WTO Sample 
(A). Alternative Weights for Spatial Lags 
 4.A.1 4.A.2 4.A.3 4.A.4 4.A.5 4.A.6 
 WTO and distance weight for spatial lags WTO and trade weight for spatial lags 
Variables OLS Cty FE Dyad FE OLS Cty FE Dyad FE 
Vi1t 0.455*** 0.424*** 0.341*** 0.541*** 0.414*** 0.433*** 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) 
Vi0t 0.053*** 0.047*** 0.033*** 0.041*** 0.030*** 0.022*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
V1jt 0.570*** 0.464*** 0.332*** 0.682*** 0.412*** 0.395*** 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.013) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) 
Vj0t 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.036*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.025*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
RTA -0.002*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
GSP -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.003*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
CU -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.005* -0.005*** -0.004** -0.005 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Observations 288,951 288,951 288,951 227,580 192,962 227,580 
R-squared 0.211 0.227 0.038 0.198 0.218 0.033 
 
(b) Without the U.S. or the OPEC Countries 
 4.B.1 4.B.2 4.B.3 4.B.4 4.B.5 4.B.6 
 Excluding the U.S. Excluding OPEC Countries 
Variables OLS Cty FE Dyad FE OLS Cty FE Dyad FE 
Vi1t 0.6240*** 0.5145*** 0.4928*** 0.628*** 0.499*** 0.476*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0145) (0.0141) (0.0158) (0.0123) (0.0147) 
Vi0t 0.0637*** 0.0705*** 0.0425*** 0.0515*** 0.0604*** 0.0342*** 
 (0.0077) (0.0066) (0.0062) (0.00753) (0.00595) (0.00614) 
V1jt 0.6661*** 0.4075*** 0.4519*** 0.642*** 0.388*** 0.436*** 
 (0.0188) (0.0181) (0.0177) (0.0193) (0.0147) (0.0184) 
Vj0t 0.0482*** 0.0517*** 0.0434*** 0.0452*** 0.0446*** 0.0379*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0057) (0.0055) (0.00639) (0.00561) (0.00561) 
RTA -0.0037*** -0.0047*** -0.0042*** -0.0045*** -0.0054*** -0.0041*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.00069) (0.00036) (0.00071) 
GSP -0.0072*** -0.0104*** -0.0035*** -0.0077*** -0.0111*** -0.0032*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.00062) (0.00035) (0.00059) 
CU -0.0061*** -0.0056*** -0.0065** -0.0072*** -0.0069*** -0.0077*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0028) (0.00160) (0.000697) (0.00297) 
Observations 299,497 299,497 299,497 282,161 282,161 282,161 
R-squared 0.189 0.202 0.039 0.194 0.208 0.036 
Notes: Year dummies are included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5. Robustness Checks with Alternative Measures of Trade Volatilities, WTO Sample 
  Rose (2005) Measure Measured based on import 
Growth 
Measure based on HP-
filter 
SUBSAMPLES VARIABLES Cty FE Dyad FE Cty FE Dyad FE Cty FE Dyad FE 
 
 
 
Pre-Kennedy round of 1948-196, Kennedy to Tokyo 
round of 1968-1978, Tokyo to Uruguay round of 
1979-1994, and post Uruguay round (WTO) of 1995-
2003. 
Vi1t 0.86148** 0.91336*** 0.85096*** 0.80429*** 1.11073*** 1.12253*** 
 (0.102) (0.080) (0.084) (0.068) (0.090) (0.079) 
Vi0t -0.18581*** -0.30039*** -0.16530*** -0.22932*** -0.34989*** -0.38081*** 
 (0.062) (0.050) (0.054) (0.044) (0.067) (0.060) 
V1jt 0.95311*** 0.77529*** 0.86710*** 0.63564*** 1.09687*** 1.12880*** 
 (0.093) (0.075) (0.091) (0.075) (0.082) (0.073) 
Vj0t 0.00709 0.08364 0.02967 0.15814** -0.10059 -0.09426 
 (0.085) (0.069) (0.082) (0.067) (0.074) (0.066) 
Observations 24,136 24,136 23,079 23,079 25,001 25,001 
R-squared 0.3402 0.3432 0.3568 0.3289 0.3021 0.3113 
Post WWII and Breton Woods era of 1948-1972, the 
common international shock period of 1973-1986, 
and the globalization era of 1987-2003. 
Vi1t 0.57269*** 0.85792*** 0.47904*** 0.60978*** 1.18510*** 1.22754*** 
 (0.126) (0.100) (0.120) (0.096) (0.098) (0.090) 
Vi0t -0.02273 -0.25016*** 0.04523 -0.07349 -0.39090*** -0.44855*** 
 (0.081) (0.064) (0.083) (0.065) (0.075) (0.069) 
V1jt 0.94924*** 0.89642*** 0.98638*** 0.80067*** 1.20489*** 1.20076*** 
 (0.096) (0.078) (0.095) (0.080) (0.091) (0.086) 
Vj0t -0.17952* -0.17138** -0.11741 -0.04147 -0.29481*** -0.30010*** 
 (0.097) (0.078) (0.090) (0.076) (0.091) (0.086) 
Observations 15,756 15,756 15,128 15,128 16,259 16,259 
R-squared 0.3921 0.3936 0.3928 0.3812 0.3216 0.3324 
 
 
 
 
Pre- and post-Uruguay rounds of GATT (1948-1985, 
1986-2003) 
Vi1t 0.67207*** 0.97739*** 0.91554*** 0.79179*** 1.65789*** 0.29509*** 
 (0.189) (0.209) (0.200) (0.212) (0.169) (0.187) 
Vi0t 0.06504 -0.02695 0.07285 0.1976 -0.61584*** -0.18502 
 (0.117) (0.125) (0.139) (0.145) (0.135) (0.146) 
V1jt 0.80723*** 0.98688*** 0.84042*** 0.84266*** 1.69377*** 1.19779*** 
 (0.152) (0.161) (0.140) (0.153) (0.178) (0.189) 
Vj0t 0.10793 -0.12676 -0.13473 -0.11773 -0.64828*** -0.22299 
 (0.140) (0.148) (0.137) (0.142) (0.174) (0.185 
Observations 11,209 11,209 10,733 10,733 11,414 11,414 
R-squared 0.3684 0.3567 0.3791 0.3449 0.3071 0.311 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6: Interactions between spatial lags and dyadic characteristics 
 Weighted by 
WTO membership 
Weighted by  
WTO membership & distance 
Weighted by  
WTO membership & trade 
 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 
 OLS Cty FE Dyad FE OLS Cty FE Dyad FE OLS Cty FE Dyad FE 
V1 1.436*** 1.478*** 1.287*** 1.422*** 1.460*** 1.279*** 1.403*** 1.476*** 1.221*** 
 (0.082) (0.051) (0.075) (0.081) (0.050) (0.075) (0.093) (0.057) (0.083) 
V1*RTA -0.154*** -0.180*** -0.041* -0.167*** -0.189*** -0.048** -0.151*** -0.185*** -0.024 
 (0.025) (0.016) (0.022) (0.025) (0.016) (0.022) (0.029) (0.019) (0.025) 
V1*CU -0.177*** -0.148*** -0.086** -0.183*** -0.158*** -0.086** -0.209*** -0.171*** -0.102** 
 (0.044) (0.027) (0.041) (0.044) (0.026) (0.041) (0.048) (0.029) (0.045) 
V1*GSP -0.090*** -0.057*** -0.084*** -0.085*** -0.050*** -0.079*** -0.090*** -0.046*** -0.084*** 
 (0.023) (0.014) (0.020) (0.023) (0.014) (0.019) (0.026) (0.016) (0.022) 
V1*lgdpsum -0.035*** -0.047*** -0.038*** -0.035*** -0.046*** -0.038*** -0.028*** -0.043*** -0.030*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
V0 0.139*** 0.170*** 0.091*** 0.140*** 0.176*** 0.091*** 0.138*** 0.165*** 0.081** 
 (0.039) (0.030) (0.030) (0.039) (0.030) (0.030) (0.042) (0.033) (0.033) 
V0*RTA 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.014 0.012 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.007 
 (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) 
V0*CU -0.006 0.000 0.023 -0.005 0.002 0.022 -0.010 -0.003 0.024 
 (0.022) (0.016) (0.018) (0.022) (0.016) (0.018) (0.023) (0.017) (0.019) 
V0*GSP -0.126*** -0.108*** -0.045*** -0.125*** -0.109*** -0.045*** -0.130*** -0.114*** -0.044*** 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) 
V0*lgdpsum -0.003* -0.005*** -0.002 -0.003* -0.005*** -0.002 -0.003 -0.004*** -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
RTA 0.010*** 0.012*** -0.000 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.000 0.008*** 0.010*** -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
CU 0.011*** 0.008*** -0.001 0.012*** 0.009*** -0.001 0.013*** 0.009*** -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
GSP 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
lgdpsum -0.000 0.004*** -0.000 -0.000 0.004*** -0.000 -0.001*** 0.004*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Observations 309,874 309,874 309,874 309,874 309,874 309,874 309,874 309,874 309,874 
R-squared 0.198 0.211 0.041 0.198 0.211 0.041 0.197 0.209 0.040 
Notes: Year dummies are included. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
